January 26, 2019 at 12:48 pm #65537John DParticipant
Might be of interest to some of you:January 26, 2019 at 2:09 pm #65539Joe (G.W.N.S.)Moderator
Excellent,thanks for posting.January 26, 2019 at 3:26 pm #65540winstonParticipant
“Expertise in combat shooting, battlefield fitness and small team tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) were the driving factors for the AFoP’s eventual success.”
Hmmmm. Now where have I heard THAT before?
Yes, yes. I know my way around MVT.January 26, 2019 at 4:33 pm #65541Joe (G.W.N.S.)Moderator
There are many excellent bits of information to be gleaned from above linked article.
Pay attention.January 27, 2019 at 4:19 pm #65544RobRoyParticipant
Thanks for posting this, I think I read it in Kyle’s autobiography that he was on two major city clearings and the second operation was more deliberate than the smash and grab via firepower and that is where he really racked up the Ks
Slow, funny looking, annoying and difficult to handle.January 28, 2019 at 9:18 am #65548tangoParticipant
This is a gold mine.
Observation: Due to difficulty in coordination and inexperience in orchestrating effects in the urban environment, command and control was highly centralised…
Lesson Learned: The most effective way to achieve tempo in this situation would be the orchestration of multiple effects simultaneously, rather than in sequence. For example, walking suppressive fire up, or across, a building in support of the break-in is much more effective than cutting fire completely…
Furthermore, continued emphasis on junior leaders must be maintained. Having platoons and sections capable of conducting simultaneous activity without micro-management increases the higher commander’s ability to layer multiple effects and achieve decision superiority.
Ground-Up Innovation: Marines of the PMC had little to no access to smoke grenades…To conduct crossings, the marines of MBLT10 would carry a long piece of fabric, the height of a marine. They attached one end of the fabric to one side of the obstacle, and had a runner sprint across the fire lane, trailing the sheet behind him. He would then tie it off, taught, to the other side of the obstacle. This then enabled the entire platoon team or combat team to cross with relative impunity…
The example highlighted above illustrates the value of allowing bottom-up innovation drive TTPs; finding localised solutions to localised problems, not necessarily aligned to doctrine, and giving front-line troops the latitude to be creative.
Use of Unmanned Aerial Systems
During the Battle of Marawi, both the AFoP and the enemy used drones extensively. Drones were employed down to platoon team/combat team level to observe both friendly troop movement as well as enemy infiltration and exfiltration routes, movement and locations.
The other key lesson for the Australian Army is that close combat forces must be adept at using UAS, and that there is benefit from increasing exposure to, and understanding of, these technologies.
[Just read this entire UAS section. Cheap drones are one the scene and here to stay.]
The ‘fight light’ concept dictates that fighting echelons need to be enabled by an agile, responsive A and B echelon.
Weak Men can't be virtuous. - JBP
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